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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2041 
____________ 
 
HERRY PANGKEY, 
    Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-576-067) 
Immigration Judge:  William Strasser 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 4, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  December 5, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Herry Pangkey (“Pangkey”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
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 Pangkey, a native and citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States on or about 
February 25, 1990 as a nonimmigrant visitor, and overstayed.  On December 16, 1993, 
the Immigration & Naturalization Service served him with an Order to Show Cause, 
which charged that he was deportable under former Immigration & Nationality Act § 
241(a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained in the U.S. for a time longer than permitted.  In 
1994, Pangkey applied for asylum, claiming a fear of persecution on account of his 
Seventh Day Adventist religious beliefs.  Among other things, Pangkey asserted that in 
Indonesia Saturday is an official work day, but he must observe the Sabbath on Saturday.  
Prior to his November 28, 1994 merits hearing, Pangkey conceded deportability.  
Following the hearing, the Immigration Judge denied relief.  Pangkey was granted 
voluntary departure and in the alternative he was ordered removed to Indonesia.  On June 
8, 1995, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal.  Pangkey did not 
petition for review of the Board’s decision and did not voluntarily depart, nor did the 
federal immigration authorities ever execute the deportation order. 
 On April 28, 2011, nearly sixteen years after the Board’s final order of removal, 
Pangkey filed a motion to reopen with the Board, and an asylum application, in which he 
argued that the untimeliness of his motion should be excused on the basis of changed 
country conditions in Indonesia.  He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution 
due to an alleged increase in the persecution of Christians in Indonesia by Muslim 
extremists, and in support of this claim, he submitted the 2009 and 2010 State 
Department International Religious Freedom Reports for Indonesia; the 2009 State 
Department Human Rights Report for Indonesia; a 2011 Human Rights Watch Report; a 
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Reuters article from 2011 describing attacks against Christian churches; internet news 
articles dated 2010 from AsiaNews and from www.persecution.org describing attacks 
against Christian churches; his own affidavit in which he stated that mistreatment of 
Indonesian Christians by Muslim extremists had increased significantly since the Board 
dismissed his case in 1995; and a letter from his Edison, New Jersey pastor.  Pangkey 
also argued that the Board should exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings 
because the agency had previously failed to do a “disfavored group” analysis in 
evaluating his asylum claim, citing Tampubolon v. Holder
 The Department of Homeland Security opposed Pangkey’s motion to reopen, 
arguing, among other things, that his evidence demonstrated improved and not worsened 
conditions.  The Government specifically noted the 2010 International Religious 
Freedom Report, which stated that: the Indonesian Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and accords all Christians the right to worship according to their own religion 
and beliefs; Indonesian law does not discriminate against any recognized religious group 
in employment, housing, or health care; the government observes several Christian 
religious holidays; there were numerous areas of improvements in religious freedom 
during the reported period; Muslim and Christian leaders were strongly committed to 
easing religious tension; the police protected churches and prayer houses during services; 
and Christian and Muslim communities continued to hold joint events. 
, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying “disfavored group” analysis to applications for withholding of removal by 
Christians, whether of Chinese descent or not). 
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 On March 19, 2012, the Board denied Pangkey’s motion to reopen in a short 
written decision.  The Board found that Pangkey failed to show how his country 
conditions evidence established materially changed conditions in Indonesia.  
Alternatively, the Board held that Pangkey’s evidence would not likely change the result 
in his case if proceedings were to be reopened, citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
464, 472-73 (BIA 1992).  The Board also declined to exercise its sua sponte authority to 
reopen proceedings, noting that we have not adopted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
“disfavored group” analysis and citing Wong v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.
 Pangkey has timely petitioned for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  In his brief, Pangkey argues that the Board abused its discretion and 
violated due process by failing to meaningfully consider and discuss his country 
conditions evidence and by failing to articulate a reason for the decision, and the Board 
abused its discretion and violated due process by failing to consider how his country 
conditions evidence established that Indonesian Christians are a “disfavored group” 
subject to violence and discrimination by Islamic extremists that the Indonesian 
government is unable or unwilling to control. 
, 539 F.3d 225, 235 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 We will deny the petition for review.  The Board’s denial of a motion to reopen is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94, 105 (1988).  Under this standard, we will not disturb the Board’s decision unless 
it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 
(3d Cir. 2004).  We uphold the Board’s factual determinations underlying the denial of 
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the motion to reopen if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 549 
F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-
Zacarias
The 90-day time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on 
changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which 
deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”  
, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).  A party may file only one motion to reopen and 
such motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the removal order.  8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).   Pangkey’s motion to reopen, filed 
almost sixteen years after the Board’s June 8, 1995 decision, was untimely and thus was 
properly denied on that basis.  
Id. at § 
1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Under the standards we set forth 
in Zheng, 549 F.3d 260, the Board must explicitly consider any country conditions 
evidence that materially bears on an applicant’s claim, see id. at 268.  Pangkey argues 
that the Board failed to explicitly consider his country conditions evidence and did not 
provide a meaningful explanation of its decision, as required by Zheng.  See
 We agree that the Board said little in rejecting Pangkey’s motion to reopen, but the 
Board specifically identified Pangkey’s submission of news articles and reports issued by 
the State Department and a non-governmental organization.  Moreover, the Board had 
before it for consideration the Department of Homeland Security’s response to Pangkey’s 
 Petitioner’s 
Brief, at 19-22.   
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motion to reopen.  This response discussed in detail the 2010 State Department 
International Religious Freedom Report, which did not support Pangkey’s argument that 
conditions for Christians had recently worsened and that the government of Indonesia 
fails to protect Christian churches and religious services.  Accordingly, the Board had a 
basis in the motion and response for determining that Pangkey’s evidence was 
inconclusive, and that he did not meet his burden to show worsened country conditions.  
We have held that the Board need not write a summary of every document submitted so 
long as its decision provides us with adequate insight into its reasoning, see Wong
 We note that Pangkey’s discussion of his country conditions evidence, including 
his 2010 and 2011 news articles which note attempts by extremists to attack churches and 
religious facilities, was reasonably thorough to the extent the evidence was favorable to 
him, A.R. 24-28.  His motion, however, omitted any discussion of the significant events 
that have occurred in Indonesia with respect to its Muslim and Christian populations from 
the time of his removal hearing in 1994, 
, 539 
F.3d at 231, and, in Pangkey’s case, we conclude that the Board did just enough. 
see, e.g., Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532-33 
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting the May 1998 riots which led to the deaths of over one thousand 
people and “represented a period of significant violence and rioting against individuals of 
Chinese origin throughout Indonesia”), until just prior to 2010, see, e.g., Wong, 539 F.3d 
at 233 (noting that, according to the 2004 State Department Country Report, 
discrimination and harassment had declined compared with previous years and steps had 
been taken by the Indonesian government to promote religious, racial, and ethnic 
tolerance and to reduce interreligious violence).  A more complete discussion of events 
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that have transpired in Indonesia since Pangkey’s hearing in 1994 would have 
demonstrated, as the Department of Homeland Security argued, that circumstances in 
Indonesia have improved and not worsened. 
 We conclude that the Board’s succinct decision that Pangkey failed to show how 
his country conditions evidence established materially changed conditions in Indonesia 
since his removal hearing provided Pangkey the process he was due.  He has identified no 
overlooked exhibit that would have changed the result.  We are confident that the Board 
fully reviewed his claim, and that the denial of reopening occurred only after the Board 
fully considered his arguments and evidence, and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
rebuttal.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that Pangkey did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception to 
the time requirement for filing a motion to reopen, see Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105; Guo, 386 
F.3d at 562.1
 Last, although the Board has the authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, 
 
see 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.23(a), its decision not to exercise its discretion, where, as here, it did not 
rely on an incorrect legal premise, is unreviewable.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 
F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also Pllumi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 
160 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Board’s decision declining to follow Ninth Circuit precedent in 
a case arising in our circuit was not based on an incorrect legal premise, see Wong
                                              
1 Because we conclude that Pangkey’s motion to reopen was untimely filed, we need not 
address the Board’s alternative determination that Pangkey’s evidence would not in any 
event change the result of the proceedings if they were reopened. 
, 539 
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F.3d at 235 n.5 (noting that we previously rejected the “disfavored group analysis” in 
Lie). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
